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INTRODUCTION

Niya Kenny was a student at Spring Valley High School in Columbia,
South Carolina, when she was arrested under the disturbing schools statute'
on October 26, 2015.2 Kenny was in her math class where students were
working on a math lesson on their computers. 3 The teacher asked one
student to put her cell phone away and the student complied.4 The same
student then logged into her email, which was unauthorized, and the teacher
had to remotely close the student's email. 5 This conduct continued three or

1.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-420(A)(1) (2010) (South Carolina's current disturbing
schools statute broadly criminalizes "any person" who disturbs a school "in any way").
2.
Letter from Dan Johnson, Solicitor, Fifth Judicial Circuit, to Captain John Bishop,
S.C. Law Enforcement Div., at 1, 11 (Sept. 2, 2016) [hereinafter Solicitor Investigation
Summary] (regarding South Carolina Law Enforcement Division Investigative File No. 32-150130).
3.
Id. at 1.
4.
Id.
5.
Id.
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four times, at which point the teacher confronted the student and saw that
she had her cell phone in her lap. 6 The teacher asked the student to give him
her cell phone, and the student refused and told the teacher to "get out of her
face."' The teacher then wrote a disciplinary referral and asked the student
to leave the classroom, but the student refused the teacher's multiple
requests.' At this point, the teacher contacted an administrator. 9 Once the
administrator arrived, the student refused to comply with the administrator's
requests to leave the classroom or to respond to him in any way.'o The
administrator then told the student that if she refused to comply with his
request to leave, he would have to call the school resource officer (SRO),
Benjamin Fields, for assistance. I
Once Fields arrived, the administrator told the student to collect her
things and leave.1 2 The student refused to comply.' 3 Fields approached her
and asked her to come with him, and she again refused to comply.1 4 Fields
asked again, and she responded that she hadn't done anything.' 5 He gave
several more verbal directives, but the student refused to leave the
classroom.1 6 Fields asked another nearby student to vacate their desk.' 7
Fields then informed the student that she was being arrested for disturbing
schools and "attempted to place her under arrest."" During the arrest, an
altercation escalated between himself and the student, which was filmed by
other students in the classroom.19 At this time, Fields used physical force,
and one video shows the student hitting Fields in the face when his hand
made contact with her arm. 20 At this point, the videos show Fields pulling
the student out of the desk, causing it to tip over on the floor, and then
"throwing" the student. 2' Richland County Sheriff Leon Lott expressed his

6.
Id.
7.
Id.
8.
Id.
9.
Id.
10. Id. at 1-2.
11. Id. at 2.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Staff Reports, Richland Co. Sheriff Leon Lott's Statement on Firing of Deputy Ben
Fields, STATE (S.C.) (Oct. 28, 2015, 3:58 PM), http://www.thestate.com/news/local/crime/arti
cle41712405.html.
2 1. Id.
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opinion that Fields "could have accomplished the arrest or handled the
situation without some of the actions he did" and that what concerned him
the most was the "throwing of the student across the floor." 22
According to Kenny, she spoke up about her disagreement with the
treatment of her classmate and encouraged other students to record the
altercation on their phones.23 Officer Fields turned to her and said, "Oh, you
have so much to say, you're coming, too." 24 Kenny and her classmate were
arrested and charged with disturbing schools.25 Kenny recalls being
"handcuffed in front of her classmates, berated by the police officer and
school administrator for voicing her concern and distress, held in an adult
detention center for several hours, patted down, finger printed, and
photographed."2 6

The Richland County sheriff fired Officer Fields two days after the
incident and requested a FBI investigation into the incident.27 Eleven months
after the incident, Richland County Solicitor Dan Johnson concluded that
Kenny did not disturb the school and dismissed her charges. 28 Based on the
evidence in the case and the FBI investigation, the solicitor found that there
was not enough evidence to prove all elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. 29 The solicitor concluded that Kenny "witnessed a
seemingly upsetting situation involving a classmate while simultaneously
expressing verbal objections to what she was witnessing."30 According to
the solicitor's analysis, Kenny's objections to the treatment of her classmate
did not violate the statute. 3 ' Although Kenny's charges were dismissed, she
was frightened and humiliated throughout her experience.3 2 She would have
liked to have finished her senior year with friends and classmates at school;
however, due to the humiliation and anxiety she experienced, Kenny did not
feel that she could return to the school, so she withdrew and entered a GED
program.33

22. Id.
23. Complaint at 17, Kenny v. Wilson, No. 2:16-cv-02794-CWH (D.S.C. Aug. 11,
2016).
24. Evie Blad, She Recorded Her Classmate's Arrest, Then Got Arrested, Too: Q&A
with Former Student Niya Kenny, EDUC. WEEK (Jan. 24, 2017), http://www.edweek.org/ew/
articles/2017/01/25/sherecorded-her-classmates-arrest-then-got.html?print=1.
25. Complaint, supra note 23, at 17.
26. Id.
27. Staff Reports, supra note 20.
28. Solicitor Investigation Summary, supra note 2, at 11-12.
29. Id. at 11.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Complaint, supra note 23, at 17.
33. Id.
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The solicitor concluded that the evidence in the case supported the other
student's arrest under the disturbing schools statute. 3 4 However, the solicitor
did not prosecute the other student because of the compromised prosecution
of the case following the administrative actions that occurred prior to the
completion of an official investigation, and the "likelihood of proving the
student guilty beyond a reasonable doubt diminishe[d] significantly." 3 5
Additionally, the solicitor noted another reason for not pursuing a
prosecution the likeliness that a jury would find the administrative actions
to be an improper interaction with the student. 36
Following the Spring Valley incident, Richland County Solicitor Dan
Johnson expressed concern over how Officer Fields performed his duties
during the incident and the use of law enforcement in South Carolina
schools.3 7 In his analysis of the evidence of the Spring Valley incident and
the corresponding FBI report, the solicitor cautioned that the unique
circumstances of the education environment are different from ordinary law
enforcement encounters on the streets, thus requiring "law enforcement
agencies to take a closer look at how they are enforcing laws in our
schools." 38 The solicitor recommended that the Richland County Sheriffs
Department continue to pursue additional training to ensure that its officers
take appropriate and lawful action to protect the safety of students, teachers,
and all citizens of Richland County.39 He further noted that law enforcement
officers are put into schools with the same tools as line officers, including
guns, pepper spray, and Tasers, and he questioned what South Carolina
citizens are asking them to do with these tools.

40

The solicitor also

questioned what we want law enforcement's role to be in schools, if there is
a better way to handle these situations, if officers are being properly trained,
and if the use of SROs in schools is an appropriate use of law enforcement
resources and personnel. 4 1
The Spring Valley incident illustrates both how South Carolina's broad
disturbing schools statute can be applied to criminalize student misbehavior
and the negative effects delinquency or criminal charges and arrests can
have on students. Kenny was charged for disturbing schools because she
spoke up for what she believed to be an injustice against a classmate and

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Solicitor Investigation Summary, supra note 2, at 10-11.
Id at 11.
Id
Id
Id
Id
Complaint, supra note 23, ¶ 87.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-420 (2010).
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tried to record the incident on her phone. Even though her charges were
dismissed eleven months after the incident, the resulting anxiety from
Kenny's experience of being arrested and taken into custody caused her to
withdraw from school and miss out on many social and educational
experiences.

42

Part II of this Note discusses the negative consequences of a broad
interpretation of the disturbing schools statute and the need for reform. Part
III traces the history of South Carolina's disturbing schools law and
illustrates how the legislature, courts, and attorneys general have steadily
expanded its scope. Part III also provides examples of students charged with
disturbing schools, and these examples serve to illuminate how shocking it is
that these students are sometimes charged for nonviolent, common student
misbehavior. Part IV discusses other states' narrower disturbing schools
statutes that contrast with South Carolina's own law and application. Finally,
Part V discusses reform efforts in South Carolina after the Spring Valley
incident and what the potential success of Senator Mia McLeod's proposed
Senate Bill 131 could mean for the future of South Carolina's disturbing
schools law if accompanied by other reforms.
II.

THE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE BROAD INTERPRETATION OF
THE DISTURBING SCHOOLS STATUTE AND NEED FOR REFORM

Under South Carolina's current disturbing schools statute, it is unlawful
for "any person willfully or unnecessarily (a) to interfere with or to disturb
in any way or in any place the students or teachers of any school or college
in this State, (b) to loiter about such school or college premises or (c) to act
in an obnoxious manner thereon." 43 "Obnoxious" is not further defined, and
the statutory language prohibiting one to disturb a school "in any way" 44
allows for a broad interpretation and a wide range of behavior that could be
criminalized under the statute. The broad language and interpretation of
South Carolina's disturbing schools statute is troubling because of racial
disparities; because it allows for students to be charged as delinquents for
common student misbehavior that could be better addressed through school
discipline procedures; and because of the negative effects arrests and
delinquency charges can have on students.
Acting United States Attorney for the District of South Carolina, Beth
Drake, filed a Statement of Interest (Statement) on November 28, 2016, in

42.
43.
44.

Complaint, supra note 23, ¶ 87.
S.C. CODE ANN. §16-17-420 (2010).
Id.
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the Kenny v. Wilson 45 case that elucidates the concerns about disturbing
schools charges in South Carolina and the nation as a whole. 46 The
Statement notes that the "arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement of
unconstitutionally vague standards can deprive individuals of their civil
rights and disproportionately affect minority populations."47 The Statement
advocates a deep interest in guaranteeing that laws provide adequate
guidance to law enforcement officers to ensure that they enforce laws
consistently and without discrimination. 48 The Statement then expresses
concern about the negative effects of law enforcement and the justice system
involvement in the cycle of harsh school discipline, known as the school-toprison pipeline. 49 The Statement goes on to assert that the school-to-prison
pipeline disproportionately affects minorities and students with disabilities,
and schools and law enforcement agencies should not use the juvenile and
criminal justice systems to address common student misbehavior.5 0 The
Statement advocates addressing the school-to-prison pipeline and notes that
the United States has made clear that school resource officers should take
law enforcement actions against students only for serious criminal conduct
or when necessary to protect students and faculty from a threat of immediate
harm. 5 ' The Statement emphasizes the importance of effective policies and
training opportunities for law enforcement to protect against the arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement of law.52 It recognizes that student behavior
is often a natural product of children's lessened maturity and that children
have a lack of experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid

45. See Kenny v. Wilson, No. 2:16-CV-2794-CWH, 2017 WL 4070961 (D.S.C. Mar. 3,
2017). Following the Spring Valley incident, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
filed a federal lawsuit challenging South Carolina's "disturbing schools" law on behalf of Niya
Kenny and several other plaintiffs in August of 2016. Kenny v. Wilson, ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/cases/kenny-v-wilson (last updated Mar. 16, 2017). The ACLU alleges
that the statute is unconstitutionally vague and violates due process protections of the
Constitution. Id The case was dismissed by the U.S. District Court for the District of South
Carolina, finding that the plaintiffs' fear of arrest or charges under the disturbing schools
statute was insufficient to grant them standing to seek an injunction against its enforcement
and making no ruling on the plaintiffs' legal claims. Kenny, 2017 WL 4070961. The Fourth
Circuit held that the plaintiffs' allegations are sufficient to establish an injury in fact, vacated
the district court's judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Kenny v. Wilson,
885 F.3d 280, 291 (4th Cir. 2018).
46. Statement of Interest of the United States at 3, Kenny v. Wilson, No. 2:16-cv02794-CWH (D.S.C. Nov. 28, 2016).
47. Id at 3-4.
48. Id at 4.
49. Id
50. Id at 5.
51. Id. at 6.
52. Id
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choices that could be detrimental to them.5' Finally, the Statement notes that
many students who "will become productive members of society could be
characterized as behaving in an 'obnoxious' or 'boisterous' manner, each of
which is prohibited under the criminal statutes challenged in this case" 54 and
that "[p]rotecting children's developmentally appropriate behavior from
being inappropriately, arbitrarily, and discriminatorily criminalized" is an
important duty of the U.S. Department of Justice.5 5
A.

RacialDisparities

South Carolina's broad disturbing schools statute is concerning because
of the racial disparities in the charges. In its complaint, the ACLU alleges
that black students are almost four times as likely to be charged with
disturbing schools as their white classmates.56 From 2006 to 2009, 76% of
juveniles referred to the family courts of South Carolina for disturbing
schools were black.5 7 The ACLU further alleges that disturbing schools
referrals in South Carolina show significant racial disparities in large and
small counties that are more and less racially homogeneous. 58 Statewide,
there are large discrepancies in how disturbing schools charges are handled,
including whether charges will be dismissed, diverted, or prosecuted, which
can lead to implicit bias and racial disparities in students charged. 59 These
racial disparities are also applicable to school discipline in general. A 2015
University of Pennsylvania study concluded that "45,494 Black students
were suspended from South Carolina K-12 public schools in a single
academic year. Blacks were 36% of students in school districts across the
state, but comprised 60% of suspensions and 62% of expulsions." 60

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id at 7.
Id
Id
Complaint, supra note 23, ¶ 76.

RESEARCH & STATISTICS SECTION, S.C. DEP'T JUVENILE JUSTICE, DISTURBING
SCHOOLS DATA FY 2008-2009 (2009), at Slide 3, http://www.state.sc.us/djj/2010%/20disturb

ing%20schools%20presentationfiles/frame.htm.
58. Complaint, supra note 23, ¶ 77; see also Kathleen DeCataldo & Toni Lang, Keeping
Kids in School and Out of Court: A School-Justice Partnership,N.Y. ST. B. Ass'N J., Jan.
2011, at 26, 28 ("[S]tudies have consistently demonstrated that children of color, in particular
Black children, are referred for discipline more frequently and for less serious offenses, tend to
be suspended for longer periods of time, and are more often subject to suspension and
expulsion compared to their White peers.").
59. Complaint, supra note 23, ¶¶ 77-78.
60. EDWARD J. SMITH & SHAUN R. HARPER, DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT OF K-12
SCHOOL SUSPENSION AND EXPULSION ON BLACK STUDENTS IN SOUTHERN STATES 41 (2015),
http://www.jetmag.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/southern-state-pdf.pdf
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The wide scope of South Carolina's disturbing schools statute gives
authorities a great deal of discretion that can invite implicit bias to influence
decision making. Implicit bias refers to "the way automatic racial bias may
have become unwittingly infused with, and even cognitively inseparable
from, supposedly race-neutral legal theories (such as retribution or
rehabilitation)
and jurisprudential approaches to well-considered
constitutional doctrines (such as Eighth Amendment excessiveness
analysis)." 61 "Research on student discipline has found no evidence that
children of color display higher rates of misbehavior compared to" their
white counterparts. 62 One study found that African-American students were
more frequently referred for behaviors that require more subjective judgment
on the part of the person making the referral, such as disrespect, excessive
noise, and threatening behavior. 63 The researchers in this study found no
evidence that racial disparities in school discipline can be explained by more
serious patterns of rule-breaking among African-American students, and it
was possible that these students were being unfairly singled out when it
came to prosecuting such behavior. 64 Niya Kenny and the other student
involved in the Spring Valley incident are both African-American.65 A broad
disturbing schools statute invites racial disparities through implicit bias and
prosecutorial discretion by giving too much discretion to school faculty and
law enforcement in their interpretation and application of the statute.
B. Delinquency Chargesfor Minor Offenses
Another problem with South Carolina's broad disturbing schools statute
is that it allows delinquency charges for minor offenses that are handled
more appropriately through school faculty and disciplinary policies. Often,
"law enforcement is being deployed to address student behavior that
traditionally would have been handled more informally through the
imposition of after-school detention or suspension .... "66 The ACLU
alleges that there is an impossibility of attempting to distinguish criminal
disturbing schools conduct from minor behaviors that should be addressed

61. Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith, Systemic Implicit Bias, 126 YALE L.J.F. 406,
408 (2017).
62. Jonathon Arellano-Jackson, But What Can We Do? How Juvenile Defenders Can
Disrupt the School-to-Prison Pipeline, 13 SEATTLE J. Soc. JUST. 751, 756 (2015) (citing
DANIEL J. LOSEN, NAT'L EDuc. POLICY CTR., DISCIPLINE POLICIES, SUCCESSFUL SCHOOLS,
AND RACIAL JUSTICE 6-7 (2011)).

63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Id.
Complaint, supra note 23, TT 16-18.
Catherine Y. Kim, PolicingSchool Discipline, 77 BROOK. L. REv. 861, 886 (2012).
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through school faculty and discipline policies, including responses as
minimal as a verbal warning or parent conference. 67 For instance, what is the
threshold for disturbing a school versus a temper tantrum? 68 Behaviors such
as

"disruption . .. fighting . . . excessive

noise . . . boisterous

play

or

pranks ... and profanity have all been listed as behaviors that can be
addressed through lesser school interventions," 69 but these minor
transgressions may lead to delinquency charges under the broad South
Carolina disturbing schools statute.70 Additionally, students have been
arrested and charged with disturbing schools for expressing concern over
police actions, as Niya Kenny did in the incident at Spring Valley High
School in 2015.71 The criminalization of common student misbehavior
charges students for conduct that would never be considered crimes if
committed by an adult or by a student off school grounds, such as
disruption. 72 As a result of the criminalization of common student
misbehavior, schools have "created an environment in which adolescent
mistakes become a criminal record and have the potential to follow students
for the rest of their lives." 73

C. Negative Impact ofStudent Arrests
South Carolina's broad interpretation of the disturbing schools statute is
also troubling because of the negative effects that arrests can have on
students. Kenny's disturbing schools charges were dismissed eleven months
after the Spring Valley incident. 74 However, Kenny dropped out of school
and instead received her GED because of the anxiety she experienced after
being arrested.7 5 Kenny's resulting anxiety and failure to return to school
after the Spring Valley incident are not unique. In fact, research shows that
arrests can have negative consequences on students: "A first arrest during
high school almost doubles the odds of the youth dropping out of school. For
youth who have a court appearance following the first arrest, the odds of

Complaint, supra note 23, ¶ 79.
See In re Doe, 318 S.C. 527, 458 S.E.2d 556 (Ct. App. 1995).
Complaint, supra note 23, ¶ 80.
Id. T 80.
Id. T 82.
Sheena Molsbee, Zeroing Out Zero Tolerance: EliminatingZero TolerancePolicies
Schools, 40 TEX. TECH L. REV. 325, 338 (2008) (citing ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET
AL., EDUCATION ON LOCKDOWN: THE SCHOOLHOUSE TO JAILHOUSE TRACK 15 (2005)).
73. Id.
74. Solicitor Investigation Summary, supra note 2, at 11.
75. Complaint, supra note 23, T 87.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
in Texas
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dropping out are nearly quadrupled." 76 With the increased use of SROs in
schools, 77 criminal charges are more easily and more frequently brought
against students for conduct such as fighting, writing on desks, and other
actions that could instead be addressed through school discipline policies by
school faculty.7 1
The trend of criminalizing school behaviors, known as the school-toprison pipeline, has flooded the juvenile and criminal courts with cases that
originated in school incidents. 79 The "pipeline starts when school
administrators and teachers push children out of the school system by
placing them on out-of-school suspension, transferring them to alternative
schools, expelling them, and/or having them arrested for minor
offenses."so These children who are pushed out of the system are often left
unsupervised and encounter more trouble on the pathway to juvenile
detention or jail." These children "face the revolving door of the criminal
punishment system, often moving from juvenile detention into the adult
criminal system." 82
Research also shows that a disproportionate number of AfricanAmerican students encounter the criminal and juvenile punishment systems
as a result of the school-to-prison pipeline, although they pose no public
safety risk.83 Psychology experts have concluded that exclusionary practices
such as suspension, expulsion, or law enforcement referrals increase a
student's shame, alienation, and feelings of rejection.84
Once a child is caught in the juvenile punishment system, some
schools will not accept them back into their programs. Other
schools fail to accept academic credits that the youth earned at the
detention facility. Dropout rates for youth returning from custody
are usually extraordinarily high, and this threatens their ability to
attend college, find a job, or qualify for public housing. These harsh

76. DeCataldo & Lang, supra note 58, at 27 (citing Gary Sweeten, Who Will Graduate:
Disruption of High School Education by Arrest and Court Involvement, 23 JUST. Q. 462
(2006)).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 32.
80. Judith A.M. Scully, Examining and Dismantling the School-to-Prison Pipeline:
Strategiesfor a Better Future, 68 ARK. L. REV. 959, 960 (2016).
8 1. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 960-61.
84. Id. at 987 (citing LAURA FAER & SARAH OMOJOLA, PUB. COUNSEL, FIX SCHOOL
DISCIPLINE: How WE CAN FIX SCHOOL DISCIPLINE TOOLKIT 5 (2012)).
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consequences often result in a child losing all hope and engaging in
further deviant behavior.8 5
To address the multifaceted issues contributing to the school-to-prison
pipeline, the American Bar Association Joint Task Force on Reversing the
School-to-Prison Pipeline supports legislation to eliminate criminalizing
common student misbehavior that does not endanger others.8 6 Another
recommended reform is providing model policies and agreements that
clarify the distinction between school discipline and law enforcement
discipline, as well as providing appropriate training for school resource
officers. 87 Although beyond the scope of this Note, the Joint Task Force also
recommends additional reforms such as removing zero-tolerance policies
from schools, supporting legislation "eliminating the use of suspensions,
expulsions, and referrals to law enforcement for lower-level offenses," and
supporting "demonstrated alternative strategies to address student
misbehavior, including Restorative Justice."" Many of these recommended
reforms are similar to reform efforts in South Carolina after the Spring
Valley incident and are discussed in Part V.
III. THE HISTORY OF DISTURBING SCHOOLS LAWS IN SOUTH CAROLINA

An analysis of the history of South Carolina's disturbing schools statute
illustrates how the courts, legislature, and attorneys general have applied the
statute to broaden its reach well beyond its initial focus. South Carolina's
first disturbing schools law was enacted in 1919.89 South Carolina lawmaker
John Ratchford proposed the law because of "incidents of men flirting with
students at the all-white women's college in his district." 90 The statute,
"Disturbing Schools Attended by Girls, or Women," made it unlawful for
"any person willfully or unnecessarily to interfere with or disturb in any way
or place the students of any school or college ... attended by women or
girls .

.

. or to act in an obnoxious manner." 9 ' This version of the law was

85. Id. at 989-90.
86. Sarah E. Redfield & Jason P. Nance, The American Bar Association Joint Task
Force on Reversing the School-to-Prison Pipeline Preliminary Report, 2016 A.B.A.
COALITION ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC JUSTICE 13 (2016).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. S.C. CODE ANN. § 28 (1919).
90. Amanda Ripley, How America Outlawed Adolescence, ATLANTIC (Nov. 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/11/how-america-outlawed-adolescence/5
01149/.
91. S.C. CODE ANN. § 28 (1919).
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intended to prevent males from flirting with female students at all-girls
schools or women's colleges. 92 The terms in the law such as interfere,
disturb, loiter, and obnoxious are not further defined by the statute. The
intent of the legislature to prevent males from flirting with female students
became widespread across the country in the 1920s when flirting laws first
emerged.93 The law retained the title "Disturbing Schools Attended by Girls,
or Women" until 1968.94
The South Carolina legislature expanded the statute as a means of
criminalizing some civil rights era protests. Representative F. Hall
Yarborough proposed South Carolina's current disturbing schools law
because he was "alarmed not only by the uprisings in his own district but by
civil-rights and antiwar protests on campuses across the country." 95
Yarborough was "interested in keeping outside agitators off campus." 96 In
February of 1968, students from South Carolina State College and Claflin
College joined forces against Orangeburg's only bowling alley, "which
remained segregated despite the Civil Rights Act of 1964."97 There were
three days of "demonstrations, protests, and police brutality." 98 On February
8, 1968, "local police officers fired into a group of unarmed students, killing
three and wounding twenty-seven." 99 This became known as the Orangeburg
Massacre.
Three weeks after the Orangeburg Massacre, South Carolina's current
disturbing schools law was signed into law by Governor Robert McNair.' 00
The current version of the law, "Disturbing schools," is no longer limited to
disturbances at schools attended by girls or women.101 Instead, the current
law is expanded to apply to all schools, not just all-girls schools or women's
colleges.1 02 Nine months after the Orangeburg Massacre and the 1968
amendment to the disturbing schools law, the assistant attorney general of
South Carolina confirmed the law's expansion. The law now applied to "acts

92.
93.

Ripley, supra note 90.
Alexis Coe, Stop That Skirt-Chaser! The Movement to Outlaw Flirtingin the 1920s,
ATLANTIC (Feb. 12, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/sexes/archive/2013/02/stop-that-skirtchaser-the-movement-to-outlaw-flirting-in-the-1920s/273068/.
94. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 1129 (1932); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1129 (1942); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-551 (1952); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-551 (1962).
95. Ripley, supra note 90.
96. Id.
97. Amy Pulaski, The OrangeburgMassacre (Mar. 30, 2011), http://www.palmettohist
ory.org/confederation/OrangeburgMassacre_ 2 0 1 1 .pdf.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Ripley, supra note 90.
101. S.C. CODE ANN. §16-17-420 (2010).
102. Id.
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done at schools attended by both sexes."103 The attorney general opinion
stated that the disturbing schools law "was amended by Act No. 943, Acts of
1968, to provide that it apply to all schools, without reference to the sex of
the students."1 04

A subsequent South Carolina attorney general opinion interpreted the
statute to apply to not only protests, but to school yard fights and even
nonviolent and otherwise noncriminal misbehavior.'0 o In 1994, the height of
tough on crime reforms,1 06 the opinion supported the disturbing schools
charges of two students fighting at school and interpreted the disturbing
schools statute broadly. 0 7 The opinion advocates the disturbing schools law
because it protects "administrators, teachers, and students" and makes
"schools the safe zones we need."'os Fighting is included within the
prohibitions of the disturbing schools statute, and the statute can be
interpreted to include any part of the school campus, regardless of whether
students or faculty are present.' 09 The opinion further notes that the use of
foul language towards a principal, teacher, or police officer can constitute a
crime, and further that this could also be charged under disorderly
conduct."o This broad interpretation of the statute advocates charges for a
student who disturbs a school in "any way" regardless of whether students or
faculty are actually present to be disturbed. Additionally, this interpretation
clarifying that bad language constitutes a criminal offense under the law
broadly interprets the statute to criminalize conduct that is normally viewed
as a school disciplinary issue.
South Carolina's current disturbing schools law is applied so broadly
that it can be used to charge an elementary school student for a temper
tantrum. In 1995, a ten-year-old was charged with disturbing schools after he
had a temper tantrum in his school cafeteria."' The child became upset
when a teacher asked him if he stole money from another student on the bus

103. S.C. Att'y Gen. Op. (Nov. 27, 1968), 1968 WL 12430, at *1.
104. Id.
105. S.C. Att'y Gen. Op. (Apr. 11, 1994), 1994 WL 199757.
106. See Kim, supra note 66, at 877-78. "Following a series of school shootings in the
1990s, a widespread sense of panic descended on public schools across the nation" that
prompted policy makers to react abruptly to what they "perceived to be a huge swing in public
opinion: a moral panic swept the country as parents and children suddenly feared for their
safety at school." Id. at 877. Zero tolerance discipline policies emerged and school resource
officers began to police school hallways.
107. S.C. Att'y Gen. Op., supra note 105.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. S.C. Att'y Gen. Op., supra note 105, at *2.
111. In re Doe, 318 S.C. 527, 533 S.E.2d 556 (Ct. App. 1995).
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and began to kick and scream when the teacher said that she would have to
take his book bag if he would not show it to her.11 2 The teacher had her aide
restrain the child because she was "afraid for the welfare of the other
children."" 3 The child "punched the aide in the neck and chest" and began
to scream and cry for one hour which disturbed nearby classes that had to be
relocated. 114 The teacher turned the child over to the school social worker,
and an investigator from the Greenville County Sheriffs Office was
dispatched.' '1 The investigator testified that when she arrived the child was
"roaming around the office and picking things up" and that at one point he
picked up a pencil as if to stab her.11 6 The investigator also testified that the
child tried to "kick and bite her and had to be placed in handcuffs and
flexcuffs.""'7 The child testified that he did not "try to kick, bite, or stab ...
[the investigator] .

.

. at any time during their meeting, but that he was only

trying to kill himself."" 8 The child was committed to a detention center for
evaluation where he was allegedly sexually assaulted.11 9
The court upheld the ten-year-old child's charge because the "evidence
clearly shows that . ..

[the child] . . . acted with violent, obnoxious, and

disruptive behavior over a period of at least an hour."1 20 The court held that
his actions "were sufficient to sustain an adjudication of delinquency for
disturbing a school as contemplated by" the statute.121 The court noted that
numerous school faculty were required to "deal with" the child.1 22 Dealing
with student misbehavior and potential psychological issues would seem to
be a normal job description for school faculty rather than something out of
the norm. Thus, this case illustrates how the broad interpretation of South
Carolina's disturbing schools statute invites delinquency charges for
common student misbehaviors that could be better dealt with by school
faculty and discipline policies.
According to the court, the ten-year-old child's behavior warranted a
commitment for psychological evaluation and simultaneously a criminal
charge for disturbing schools.1 23 The court used the evidence that the child

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 558.
Id
Id
See id.
Id
Id
Id
See id.
Id. at 561.
Id. at 560.
Id
See id. at 561.
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tried to kill himself in its discussion of the "circumstances" warranting the
charge.' 24 The court's broad application of the statute seems to ignore the
fact that this child would have benefited from some form of support or
counseling instead of a criminal charge. Additionally, while the child was at
the Reception and Evaluation Center for his evaluation, he was allegedly
sexually assaulted by other youths.1 25 This case further illustrates the
negative effects that arrests and delinquency charges can have on children.
A 1999 attorney general opinion takes a step beyond the 1968 goal of
applying the statute to all outside agitators. This contrasts with both the
original intent of the 1919 law to protect girls at all-girls schools from males
who did not attend the school and with the intent of the 1968 amendment to
protect against outside agitators. The opinion stated that the disturbing
schools law "does not limit the application of the disturbance of school
offense to perpetrators entering from off campus."1 26 The opinion notes that
"provision (2) addresses people who enter from off campus or who remain
on campus without a legitimate purpose" and that "provision (1) certainly
applies to students on campus or in the classroom as well."1 27 This attorney
general opinion confirms the expansion of the disturbing schools law to
students at their own school and concludes "in short, a student can be
charged under [the law] for an offense committed at school."1 28 The
application of the law expanded to apply to students who are at their own
school and whose conduct may fall within the broad range of the disturbing
schools statute.
In a 2006 case, the Supreme Court of South Carolina held that a juvenile
charged under the disturbing schools statute lacked standing to challenge the
statute as facially vague and that the disturbing schools statute "was not
impermissibly overbroad in violation of ... [the] ... First Amendment."1 29
The juvenile was charged for disturbing a school after he "paced about the
classroom and refused to remain in his desk; cursed to his teacher and other
students; and harassed one student with comments about the student's
mother."1 30 Additionally, the juvenile had to be removed from the classroom
and "began yelling and cursing, swung a punch at his teacher as he left the
classroom, and continued his tirade as he was escorted down the hall."131

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 560.
Id. at 558.
S.C. Att'y Gen. Op. (July 12, 1999), 1999 WL 626642, at *1.
Id.
Id.
In re Amir X.S., 371 S.C. 380, 382-92, 639 S.E.2d 144, 145-50 (2006).
Id. at 150.
Id.
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The court held that "there can be no doubt that Appellant's conduct falls
within the most narrow application of' the disturbing schools statute. 3 2 The
court noted that the juvenile did not have standing to facially challenge the
disturbing schools statute on grounds of vagueness because he "had prior
notice that this type of conduct was prohibited," as he was previously
charged under the statute.' 3 3 The court held that South Carolina's disturbing
schools statute is not overbroad and does not "prohibit First Amendment
speech" nor does it "broadly regulate conduct like a breach of the peace
statute." 3 4 The court maintained that the disturbing schools statute
"criminalizes conduct that 'disturbs' or 'interferes' with schools, or is
'obnoxious.""1 3 5 Further, the court held that expressive conduct that is
"accompanied by disorder or disturbance of schools" is not protected by the
First Amendment. 3 6 The court reasoned that the State has a "legitimate
interest in maintaining the integrity of its education system"13 7 and that
"[t]his objective is necessarily achieved in part by school discipline."' 3 8
Thus, conduct that "interferes with the State's legitimate objectives may be
prohibited." 19 The court maintained a broad interpretation of the disturbing
schools statute, establishing that any conduct that "interferes" with the
State's objective of maintaining the integrity of the education system could
be charged under the statute.
In 2010, the South Carolina Court of Appeals continued this overbroad
application of the disturbing schools statute when it upheld a student's
conviction under the statute for threatening violence.1 40 After being teased
by other students, a student responded by pointing at the students and saying
she was "going to shoot everyone on the last day of school" and added that
"her father has an AK-47." 141 The other students reported the threat to the
assistant principal, and the student was suspended for three days.1 42
Teachers and administrators monitored the student's behavior, and the
assistant principal testified that such monitoring "takes away from his

132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 148.
135. Id. at 149.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See In re Joelle T., No. 2010-UP-547, 2010 WL 10088227, at *1
Dec. 16, 2010).
141. Id. at *3.
142. See id. at *4.
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normal duties and caused a disruption at school."' 43 The assistant principal
testified that he had to speak with "ten to fifteen students about the incident
over the course of two days" as evidence of such disruption from his normal
duties. 144
The court agreed with the assistant principal's point and held that "[t]he
school had to divert staff's time to monitor her more closely"1 45 and further
agreed with the prosecutor who could "think of nothing more disrupting than
having a threat of shooting up a school."1 46 Threatening to shoot students at
school is a serious threat that demands a consequence. However, monitoring
a student's behavior and following up with other students would seem to fall
under the normal duties of school administrators and teachers.
The court held that the evidence showed that the student "acted in a
disruptive and obnoxious manner by pointing at several students and
threatening to shoot everyone on the last day of school" and that she
"perpetuated the disturbance by admitting to the statement and claiming her
father owned an AK-47." 147 The court held that the student did violate the
disturbing schools statute.1 48 The court looked at the "ordinary meanings of
words used in the statute" and defined "disturb" as "to break up or destroy
the tranquility or settled state of; to trouble emotionally or mentally;
upset."1 49 The court defined "interfere" as "to come between so as to be a
hindrance or an obstacle" and "obnoxious" as "very objectionable; odious,
exposed to harm or evil."15 0

In conclusion, the court found the student's threat to be "chilling" and
held that it was "imperative" for the assistant principal to "take the
comments seriously for the sake of safety."' 5 ' Further, the court held that the
student's behavior "caused a disturbance necessitating the subsequent
actions of.

.

. [the assistant principal] .

.

. and law enforcement."1 52 Finally,

the court noted that the threatened students "were afraid she might carry out
the threat and the teachers and staff at the school were on heightened alert
for any type of behavior that might indicate ... [the student] ... would or
could carry out her threat."1 53

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at *5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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The court's broad definition of the statute in this case categorized a
threat of violence as disruptive because it required the faculty to spend time
investigating the issue and assuring the safety of their students. The school
faculty and law enforcement's response is arguably a required duty of school
faculty, and a threat of violence could be dealt with according to the school's
discipline handbook instead of charging it as disruptive or obnoxious
behavior under the broad disturbing schools statute. Similar to the court's
reasoning in In The Interest of Doe, the court held that student action that
necessitates attention of school faculty is somehow beyond the normal realm
of their duty and thus constitutes a "disruption" rather than the natural
consequence of being in a school setting where school faculty are trained
and employed to deal with situations that may arise as the result of student
behavior.1 54
IV. SOUTH

CAROLINA'S

CONTRASTS WITH
INTERPRETATIONS

BROAD

OTHER

DISTURBING

STATES'

SCHOOLS

NARROWER

STATUTE

LANGUAGE

AND

In contrast to South Carolina's broad disturbing schools statute that
makes it a crime to "disturb in any way," several other states have narrowed
the scope of their disturbing schools statutes, or their courts have interpreted
the statutes more narrowly than in South Carolina. In Nevada, the disturbing
schools statute requires a person to commit the disturbance "maliciously." 5 5
The Nevada statute further prohibits assault of a pupil or employee and
defines "assault," "maliciously," and "school employee."1 56 Nevada defines
"maliciously" as "an evil intent, wish or design to vex, annoy or injure
another person."157 "Malice may be inferred from an act done in willful
disregard of the rights of another, or an act wrongfully done without just
cause or excuse, or an act or omission of duty betraying a willful disregard
of social duty." 55 Delineating specific behaviors, requiring malice, and
defining terms makes Nevada's statute more narrow than South Carolina's.
New Hampshire's statute is limited to any person "not a pupil."1 59 New
Hampshire's statute is narrower than South Carolina's because South
Carolina currently allows students at their own school to be charged under

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

See id.
NEV. REv. STAT. § 392.910(2) (2015).
Id.
Id. § 193.0175.
Id.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193:11 (1973).
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the statute. North Carolina requires a "substantial interference."1 60 Although
substantial interference is not further defined, it is more narrow than South
Carolina's prohibition on disturbing in "any way."161 Colorado's statute only
prohibits disturbances "through the use of restraint, abduction, coercion, or
intimidation or when force and violence are present or threatened."1 62
Arizona's statute requires a threat "to cause physical injury" and delineates
specific behaviors prohibited under the statute. 163 Delineating specific
offenses and providing guidelines like Colorado and Arizona not only
narrows the statute but allows for more narrow and consistent application by
law enforcement and school officials. Because South Carolina's statute is so
broad, it gives discretion to law enforcement, school faculty, and prosecutors
to charge students for a wide range of unspecified behaviors.
The narrow interpretation of Maryland's disturbing schools statute by
the Maryland Court of Appeals provides a stark contrast to the interpretation
and application of the disturbing schools statute in South Carolina and
illustrates sound reasoning in favor of a narrow interpretation. The Maryland
Court of Appeals held that routine school disturbances do not constitute
juvenile delinquency charges under the disturbing schools statute.1 64 The
Maryland Court of Appeals held that a "juvenile's mere writing on a wall at
school, without regard to the content of the writing, could not constitute a
violation" 165 of the Maryland disturbing schools statute.1 66
A middle school teacher observed one of his students writing "there is a
bomb" on the wall in pencil.1 67 As the teacher approached the student, the
student tried to erase the word "bomb" with his hand.1 68 The teacher
escorted the student to the principal's office, the student's mother was
called, and the deputy sheriff arrived.1 69 The student admitted to writing
"there is a bomb" on the wall and that "he didn't know what he was
doing."1 0 The court noted that the principal obviously did not take it as a
serious bomb threat as he "took no action to clear the building, to alert the
fire marshal or any bomb detection agency, or to otherwise disrupt the

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

In re Eller, 417 S.E.2d 479, 482 (N.C. 1992).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-420(A)(1) (2010).
People ex rel. J.P.L., 49 P.3d 1209, 1210 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-291 1(A)(1)(a) (2016).
In re Jason W., 837 A.2d 168, 175 (Md. 2003).
Id. at 173.
MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 26-101 (West 2002).
In re Jason W., 837 A.2d at 170.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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normal operation of the school."171 Based on this evidence, the student was
charged 72 under Maryland's disturbing schools statute which "makes it
unlawful for a person willfully to disturb or otherwise prevent the orderly
conduct of the activities, administration, or classes of any institution of
elementary, secondary, or higher education."1 73
The trial court found the student delinquent, and the student appealed,
contending that the statute had not been violated because there was no
"evidence of any actual disturbance or disruption of school activities."174
The Court of Special Appeals agreed and reversed the judgment, noting that
there was no evidence presented that classes "were halted or that other
students were even aware of the event and that, although school personnel
had to discipline . . . [the student] .

.

. and the police were called, 'the

situation did not constitute the type of disturbance or disruption of the
orderly conduct of school activities, administration, or classes' as
contemplated by the statute. 175
The Maryland Court of Appeals analyzed the legislative history of the
disturbing schools statute to help "illuminate its purpose and scope."1 76 The
court noted that although "there is no official legislative history of the 1970
Maryland law," contemporary press reports "reveal that the bill was a
response to a wave of rioting, violent racial confrontations, and vandalism at
high schools in Prince George's County and Annapolis" 7 7 in addition to
organized disturbances on college campuses and that the "broadening and
focused application of trespass, disorderly conduct, or school disturbance
laws was then a national phenomenon."17 The court's analysis of the
legislative history reveals that, in 1977, "the school disruption provisions,
though carrying criminal penalties, were thus removed from the criminal
code and placed back in the public education laws, where they began."1 79
The legislative history of Maryland's disturbing schools law reveals that
when the 1970 Act was pending before the legislature, "some concern was
expressed about its breadth," and the fear was raised that "if read liberally,
the Act 'could be applied to a kindergarten pupil throwing a temper

171. Id.
172. The student was also charged under "then-Maryland Code, Art. 27, § 9, making it a
felony to threaten to explode a destructive device." Id.
173. Id. at 170.
174. Id. at 171.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 172.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 173.
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tantrum.""s The court clarified that this was clearly not the legislative
intent and reiterated the focus "on riots and organized demonstrations and
disturbances that actually impeded the schools from carrying out their
administrative and educational functions" from 1970 to 1977.181
The Maryland Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court's view that
"merely writing on the wall, without regard to the content of the writing"
constitutes a violation of the disturbing schools statute because "the
administration would have to take care of the investigation [and] cleaning" is
"clearly untenable."1 82 The court noted that the juvenile court's reading of
the disturbing schools statute "would make criminal any unauthorized
conduct that requires even a minimal response by a school official, and that
would, indeed raise the specter of a young child being hauled into juvenile
court and found delinquent for throwing a temper tantrum in school."' 83 The
court noted that a typical public school deals with a wide range of students
varying in age, needs, problems, and abilities, and that the "orderly conduct
of the activities, administration, or classes" referred to in the disturbing
schools statute "takes into account and includes within it conduct or
circumstances that may momentarily divert attention from the planned
classroom activity and that may require some intervention by a school
official."' 84 The court further reasoned that "disruptions of one kind or
another no doubt occur every day in the schools, most of which, we assume,
are routinely dealt with in the school setting by principals, assistant
principals . . . [and faculty] . . . as part of their jobs and an aspect of school
administration." '8 5

The court conceded that some conduct rises to the level of seriousness
or disruption to warrant "criminal, juvenile, or mental health intervention"
but that "there is a level of disturbance that is simply part of the school
activity, that is intended to be dealt with in the context of school
administration, and that is outside the ambit of' the disturbing schools
statute. 8 6 Finally, the court urged that the words "disturb or otherwise
willfully prevent" in the disturbing schools statute cannot be read "too
broadly or too literally." 8 7 The court found that the "only sensible reading
of the statute is that there must not only be an "actual disturbance" but that

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 173-74.
Id. at 174.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 175.
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the disturbance must be more than a minimal, routine one.""I A disturbance
that rises to the level of violating the disturbing schools statute must be "one
that significantly interferes with the orderly activities, administration, or
classes at the school." 8 9 The court found no such disturbance in this case as
the principal did not even take the bomb threat seriously.' 90
The Maryland Court of Appeals' rationalization of the disturbing
schools statute contrasts with the interpretation of South Carolina's
disturbing schools statute discussed above. The ten-year-old boy in South
Carolina who was charged for having a temper tantrum in the cafeteria that
required school faculty to deal with the situation' 91 would likely have been
interpreted differently by the Maryland Court of Appeals. The Maryland
Court of Appeals "sought to counteract an increasing trend in discipline in
educational institutions."1 92 School officials "have been quick to categorize
routine disturbances as serious" because they are "eager to have disobedient
students removed from school grounds."' 93 The criminalization of common
misbehaviors has "led to rising police involvement in schools and more
frequent juvenile delinquency adjudications for offenses committed by
students during school hours."' 94 This trend has "strained the already
overburdened juvenile system."1 95 The court's decision is "meant to
discourage educators from using juvenile courts as a forum for punishing
troublesome students."1 96 In conclusion, "common sense dictates routine
school disturbances be dealt with in school by those most appropriate to
discipline students-teachers and administrators."1 97 Therefore, South
Carolina courts and legislators should consider this narrower approach to the
disturbing schools statute to reduce student arrests for common misbehavior
better handled by school faculty and discipline policies.

188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See In re Doe, 318 S.C. 527, 535, 458 S.E.2d 556, 561 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding
there was sufficient evidence to sustain the trial judge's adjudication of delinquency).
192. Katherine Kiemle, In Re Jason W.: Routine School DisturbancesDo Not Warrant
Juvenile Delinquency Charges, 34 U. BALT. L.F. 21, 22 (2004).
193. Id. at 22.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id
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POST-SPRING VALLEY REFORM EFFORTS IN SOUTH CAROLINA AND
SENATE BILL 131

The incident at Spring Valley received national attention and prompted
lawmakers and educators in South Carolina to look closely at South
Carolina's disturbing schools statute and other elements which contribute to
the wide use of the statute.1 98 First, the incident at Spring Valley prompted
the South Carolina Department of Education to organize a Safe Schools
Task Force aimed at examining "current school policies and educator and
law enforcement training criteria and making recommendations as to best
practices to ensure safe school climates throughout the state."1 99 The task
force also aimed to "come up with better methods for disciplining students
and training teachers." 200 Second, the Richland County school districts and
the Richland County Sheriffs Department renegotiated their Memorandum
of Agreement (MOA) in April of 2017, which increased funding for
SROs 20 1 and "strongly encourages alternatives to arrest for crimes that are
minor in nature," while defining "minor in nature" as crimes such as
disorderly conduct, trespassing, and loitering.202 The MOA offers
alternatives to formal charges such as "referrals to the Richland County
Sheriffs Department Youth Services Division for intervention programs or
school based restorative justice programs."20 3 The MOA leaves SROs with
discretion to determine whether law enforcement action is appropriate, when
to file formal charges, and when to allow the school to handle the issue
based on its disciplinary codes. 204 Finally, in 2016, Senator Mia McLeod
proposed Senate Bill 131 to limit disturbing schools charges to nonstudents. 205 There are additional important reform efforts that have occurred
since the Spring Valley incident that are beyond the scope of this Note.

198. Sarah Aarthun & Holly Yan, Student's Violent Arrest Caught on Video; Officer
Under Investigation, CNN (Oct. 27, 2015, 12:50 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/26/us/
south-carolina-spring-valley-high-school-student-video/index.html.
199. S.C.

DEP'T EDUC., SOUTH CAROLINA SAFE SCHOOLS TASKFORCE REPORT 3

(2016), https://ed.sc.gov/newsroom/public-information-resources/south-carolina-safe-schoolstaskforce-report/.
200. Dal Kalsi, Safe Schools Task Force Make Recommendationsfor SC, Fox CAROLINA
(Apr. 5, 2016, 10:32 AM), http://www.foxcarolina.com/story/31414573/safe-schools-task-for
ce-to-make-recommendations-for-sc.
201. Memorandum of Agreement between Richland County School District Two and the
Richland County Sheriff s Department for the 2017-2018 School Year (Apr. 1, 2017).
202. Id. at 3.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. S. 131, 2015-2016 Gen. Assemb., 121st Sess. (S.C. 2016).
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The effects of these reforms are positive. The South Carolina
Department of Juvenile Justice's Annual Statistical Report for the 20162017 Fiscal Year reported "a sharp decrease in the number of juveniles
charged with Disturbing School offenses."20 6 Disturbing schools still
rounded out the top five of the "most frequent offenses associated with
delinquency referrals to the family court" with 652 cases,20 7 but this is a
drastic decline from the 1,300 juveniles charged with disturbing schools in
the 2015-2016 fiscal year.208 The report credits the decrease in disturbing
schools charges to "part of larger efforts to prevent students from entering
the 'school-to-prison pipeline' for minor transgressions."2 0 9 The DJJ
advocated handling minor transgressions "directly by school officials and
local resource officers, rather than pushing youth into the juvenile justice
system."2 10 The DJJ is working to "lower juvenile crime and incarceration
through a series of both new and existing programs and initiatives designed
to prevent offenses for at-risk youth, and to provide treatment and
rehabilitation to juveniles who already committed offenses." 21' The report
states that the DJJ's goals of recent reforms are to "ensure a therapeutic
rather than punitive model of juvenile justice in the least restrictive
restorative justice environment."212 Based on this report, the attention that
the Spring Valley incident has drawn to South Carolina's disturbing schools
statute and the reforms that followed have made a positive difference in the
number of arrests for disturbing schools. The aims of the DJJ are promising,
but their success depends upon reforms of multiple factors and not just the
reform of a single statute.
The success of proposed Senate Bill 131 could continue the trend in
decreased student arrests for disturbing schools. The bill was proposed by
Senator Mia McLeod, who proposed the legislation to "take our 'disturbing
schools' law back to its original intent, which is to protect our (in-school)
students from outside agitators." 2 13 Ironically, this original intent parallels
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senate.com/blog/why-im-running/.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol69/iss4/4

24

Coble: Disturbing Schools Law in South Carolina
883

CRIMINAL JUSTICE

2018]

the legislative intent during the civil rights movement to keep outside
agitators off campus in response to civil rights protests. 214 The proposed bill
responds to recent reports that indicate "an increase in the number of South
Carolina students arrested for disturbing schools" and advocates that "it is in
the best interest of all South Carolinians that all students be given every
opportunity

to succeed

in South Carolina's

school systems."

215

The

proposed bill urges educators and school administrators to "exhaust all
avenues of behavioral discipline in accordance with the school's code of
conduct prior to requesting the involvement of law enforcement officials." 216
In response to the increased use of SROs for student discipline in schools,
the proposed bill urges law enforcement officials to "seek the normal
standards of proof' and "maintain and apply officer discretion" when
"enforcing the criminal laws of this State on school Grounds." 217
The proposed bill seeks to "restructure the offenses" in the current law
to "provide a delineated list of those actions which involve disturbing
schools" and to "revise a penalty for a violation of disturbing schools
offense, and to provide an exception for school-sponsored athletic
events." 218 The proposed bill prohibits "a person who is not a student" from
disrupting or disturbing the "normal operations of a school" and delineates
behaviors encompassed under this prohibition. 219 The bill would exclude the
vast majority of students from the scope of the criminal statute. 220 Prohibited
behaviors of non-students include: initiating a physical assault; threatening
physical harm to a student or employee; being loud after instruction by
school personnel to refrain from the conduct; and threatening the use of
deadly force when the person has the present ability to carry out the
threat. 221 Students at their own schools are only criminalized for making
"threats to take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon another by using
any form of communication whatsoever. "222
This bill is narrower than the current law because it specifies behaviors
that fall under the prohibited conduct of the statute and protects students at
their own schools by only criminalizing threats to take the life of or inflict
bodily harm. These changes would make South Carolina's law more akin to
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New Hampshire's disturbing schools statute that only applies to any person
"not a pupil";223 Nevada's statute that delineates prohibited behaviors such
as assault of a pupil or employee; 224 and Arizona's statute that delineates
prohibited behaviors such as a threat that "causes physical injury." 225 In
comparison to the current statute that criminalizes any person who disturbs a
school "in any way," 226 the proposed bill could yield a more limited and
consistent application by school resource officers, school administrators, and
courts. A student who misbehaves at their own school cannot be charged
under the proposed law unless the behavior rises to the level of threatening
to inflict bodily harm.
Under the proposed bill, the ten-year-old charged under the statute for
throwing a temper tantrum discussed in Part III would not be charged for
disturbing a school. 227 Likewise, the juvenile charged with disturbing a
school discussed in Part III, who "paced about the classroom and refused to
remain in his desk" and made a commotion when being removed from the
classroom, would not be charged under the bill. 228 Instead of being charged
for disturbing a school and being pushed into the juvenile justice system,
these behaviors could be addressed through school policies by school
teachers, administrators, and counselors. On the other hand, it is likely that
the juvenile charged with disturbing schools for threatening to shoot
everyone and noting that her dad had an AK-47 229 would still be charged
under the proposed bill for "making threats to take the life of or to inflict
bodily harm upon another by using any form of communication
whatsoever." 230 However, a threat to shoot students and referencing access
to a gun should yield a more serious consequence than a ten-year-old having
a temper tantrum in his school cafeteria.
Specified prohibited behaviors in the narrow, proposed bill prevents
school administrators, school resource officers, law enforcement, and courts
from charging student misbehavior under the statute unless it rises to the
level of threatening to inflict bodily harm. Even for non-students, the
delineated, prohibited behaviors by non-students also prevent minor
transgressions from escalating to an arrest or charge under the statute. Thus,
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the proposed bill could narrow what has been in doctrine and practice an
overbroad statute.
If the bill is passed in 2018, the narrowing of the scope of the law is a
step in the right direction. However, it is not likely that narrowing the scope
of the law will be enough to truly reform the criminalization of common
student misbehavior and the funneling of juveniles into the criminal justice
system. Students may still be charged under other criminal statutes such as
assault and battery. 231' Therefore, the success and impact of the proposed bill
depends on an accompaniment of other reforms that are beyond the scope of
this Note. The success of the proposed bill will hopefully add to the current
reform efforts and improving reports from the South Carolina Department of
Juvenile Justice by narrowing the statute and further reducing student arrests
for common misbehavior better handled through school faculty and
discipline policies.
VI. CONCLUSION

An analysis of the history of South Carolina's disturbing schools law
reveals that South Carolina courts, legislators, and attorneys general have
broadened its scope, thus permitting common student misbehaviors to yield
criminal charges and thrust juveniles into the criminal justice system. The
negative effects of arrests, criminal charges, suspensions, and expulsions on
youth warrant close attention and call for further reform efforts. The Spring
Valley incident gained local and national attention, but this one incident is
illustrative of a pattern and history of a broad statute that has criminalized
common student misbehaviors that are often better dealt with by school
administrators and school discipline policies rather than law enforcement
and the criminal justice system. Reform efforts in South Carolina postSpring Valley, including Senator McLeod's proposed bill to narrow the
scope of the disturbing schools statute, are a step in the right direction, but
one reform on its own is not likely to truly harness the change needed in the
tangled web of school discipline and juveniles in the criminal justice system.
Kristen Coble

231. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-600(E) (2015).
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